The Chairman says...

Just about every night now I'm tuning in to the Olympics. And every night, right around the 9 o'clock hour, they check in with Bob Costas at the "International Broadcasting Booth." They have him sitting at this desk, with a shot of Tiananmen Square in the background, and over his left shoulder (on our, the viewers', right-hand side) is a clear shot of the larger-than-life portrait of Mao Tse-Tung hanging from the Tiananmen Gate. This got me to thinking about a book that I read three summers ago, during my first summer of law school. The book: "On Guerrilla Warfare" by Mao Tse-Tung.

In the spirit of intercultural exchange, engendered and inspired by the Beijing Olympics, let me offer you some quotes from that book:

Political power comes out of the barrel of a gun.

The first law of war is to preserve ourselves and destroy the enemy.

Historical experience is written in blood and iron.

Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained. The essence of guerrilla warfare is thus revolutionary in character.

Evil does not exist in guerrilla warfare but only in the unorganized and undisciplined activities that are anarchism -- Mao quoting Lenin.

Guerrilla warfare is the primary war strategy of a people seeking to emancipate itself -- Mao quoting Chang Tso Hua.

Guerrilla strategy is the only strategy possible for an oppressed people -- Mao quoting Kao Kang.

The people must be inspired to cooperate voluntarily. We must not force them, for if we do, it will be ineffectual.

Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.

We further our mission of destroying the enemy by propagandizing his troops, by treating his captured soldiers with consideration, and by caring for those of his wounded who fall into our hands. If we fail in these respects, we strengthen the solidarity of our enemy.

[T]he fundamental axiom of combat on which all military action is based [. . . : c]onservation of one's own strength; destruction of enemy strength.

In all battles and wars, a struggle to gain and retain the initiative goes on between the opposing sides, for it is the side that holds the initiative that has the liberty of action. When an army loses the initiative, it loses its liberty; its role becomes passive; it faces the danger of defeat and destruction.

The book clearly demonstrates -- in its 114 pages (which are really less, since the first 40 pages are a scholar's introduction) -- that Mao was a pragmatic politician who understood the basic principles of politics, which necessarily included a seemingly instinctual, yet well-thought-out and logical, understanding of the masses and the practical need for concentrated, mobile military action to harass the establishment's armed forces in the campaign to gain popular appeal, and thus political strength.

Despite the brevity of the book, one is struck with the simple power of Mao's thinking. And as a result, one is left to understand how Mao continues to convey such influence, even authority, over China -- its government, society, and its people -- and at a more basic level, why you and I saw his face looking at us from the exterior wall of the Gate of Heavenly Peace into our living rooms over the course of these 2008 Olympics.